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Abstract
We review the micro-level evidence on the eﬀects of trade and investment liberalization in
the developing world. We focus, in particular, on the eﬀects of the 1991 trade reform in India,
since it provides an excellent controlled experiment in which the eﬀects of a drastic trade
regime change can be measured. The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. 1) There is
evidence of trade-induced productivity gains (in this respect, however, India is something of an
exception); 2) These gains mainly stem from the intra-industry reallocation of resources among
ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels and: 3) they are larger in import competing sectors; 4)
There is no evidence of signiﬁcant scale eﬃciency gains. Indeed, unilateral trade liberalization
is often associated with a reduced scale eﬃciency; 5) There is evidence of a pro-competitive
eﬀect of trade liberalization; 6) There is no evidence either of learning-by-exporting eﬀects or
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1of beneﬁcial spillover eﬀects from foreign owned to local ﬁr m s ;7 )T h e r ei se v i d e n c eo fs k i l l
upgrading induced either by technology imports, or by trade-induced reallocations of market
shares in favor of plants with higher skill-intensity; 8) There is no evidence of trade-induced
increases in labor demand elasticities. Direct evidence suggests, however, that trade exposure
raises wage volatility; 9) There is no evidence of substantial employment contraction in import
competing sectors.
JEL classiﬁcation:F 1
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, many developing countries (e.g., Chile in the late 1970s, Turkey in 1983, Mexico
in 1985, Colombia in 1990-91, India in 1991) have undergone a deep economic transformation which
has involved a process of dramatic trade liberalization. This paper reviews the main empirical
studies using ﬁrm and plant-level panel data to investigate the eﬀects of trade reforms on ﬁrm
performance and labor market outcomes in developing countries. We discuss, in particular, the
eﬀects of the 1991 trade reform in India, since it provides an excellent controlled experiment in
which the eﬀects of a drastic trade regime change can be measured.
The allocative eﬃciency argument for free trade has been extensively debated by the traditional
trade theory in the context of perfectly competitive markets. Since the late 1970s, however, the
so-called new trade theory has shown that the gains from trade originating from specialization
according to comparative advantage are only part of the story, since in the presence of imperfectly
competitive markets trade liberalization can bring additional gains by reducing the deadweight
losses created by domestic ﬁrms’ market power. In particular, it has been argued that trade liber-
alization, by increasing competition, forces ﬁrms to lower price-marginal cost mark-ups and hence
move down their average cost curves, thereby raising ﬁrm size and scale eﬃciency. Recently, it
2has also been shown that in the presence of within-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity, trade liberalization
causes more productive ﬁrms to expand at the expense of less eﬃcient ﬁrms (which either shrink
or exit), thereby inducing additional eﬃciency gains. Moreover, trade and investment liberaliza-
tion may foster technology advancement and productivity growth in developing countries through
several channels, such as technology advancement embodied in imported capital goods and interme-
diate inputs, technology transfers accompanying foreign direct investment, learning-by-exporting
eﬀects, etc.
In the last decade, a number of empirical works have resorted to ﬁrm and plant-level panel
data to see whether the predicted gains from trade liberalization have materialized in some recent
episodes of drastic trade reform in the developing world. Most of these studies ﬁnd that trade reform
in developing countries was indeed accompanied by productivity growth, technology advancement,
falling mark-ups and a reshuﬄi n go fr e s o u r c e st o w a r dt h em o r ee ﬃcient ﬁrms, although in some
cases the evidence may fail to convince because of the hurdles involved in the methodology used
in these studies. This is true, in particular, for India, where in some cases studies using slightly
diﬀerent methodologies ﬁnd opposite results. However, aside from methodological issues, India
seems an exception with respect to other trade liberalizing developing countries, since most studies
ﬁnd that the 1991 trade reform was in fact accompanied by a reduced productivity growth. One
explanation for this result is that India is still a heavily regulated economy, and hence the expected
beneﬁts of industrial restructuring and of the trade-induced reallocation of resources are probably
smaller and will take longer to materialize.
Although the eﬃciency argument for trade liberalization has generally been accepted, the main
argument against trade reform in the developing countries that have opted for an import substi-
tution industrialization strategy has often been that trade liberalization would exacerbate income
inequality and hence deteriorate the conditions of the poor. In particular, concerns regarding higher
unemployment among workers displaced by the contraction of import competing sectors, greater
uncertainty and precariousness of job conditions, and the creation of new job opportunities only
3for the most qualiﬁed segments of the workforce have often been deemed inevitable consequences
of trade liberalization.
In this respect, the traditional trade theory (which removes, by assumption, uncertainty and
unemployment) should have been reassuring, since its most celebrated theorem (the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem) predicts that a skill-poor developing country opening up to international
competition will experience a reduction in wage income inequality. However, the empirical evi-
dence contradicts this prediction, since it shows that the recent episodes of trade liberalization in
developing countries are generally accompanied by a dramatic increase in wage inequality. The
recent theoretical and empirical literature can explain this puzzling evidence, since it shows that in
the presence of imperfectly competitive markets, increasing returns to scale and ﬁrm heterogeneity,
trade liberalization can indeed exacerbate wage inequality even in a skill-poor developing country.
Plant-level evidence also shows that trade reforms in developing countries do not generally
bring a sharp contraction of import competing skill-intensive sectors. Further, the evidence shows
that trade exposure is associated with a greater wage volatility, but also with a greater investment
in technology and human capital. This evidence, too, can generally be explained by trade models
based on increasing returns to scale and imperfectly competitive markets.
A few recent papers address related issues from diﬀerent perspectives. Harrison and Hanson
(1999) focus on three empirical issues concerning the impact of trade reform. First, they address
the question of the weak econometric link between trade policy and long-run growth, and argue
that it may be due to the fact that, because of the lack of data, trade policy cannot yet be
measured adequately. The second and third issues addressed by the authors are the small impact
on employment and the large impact on wage inequality of trade reforms in developing countries.
We will mention their results on these topics in the second part of the paper. Matusz and Tarr
(1999), and Bacchetta and Jansen (2001) survey the evidence on the adjustment costs of trade
liberalization. They show that the overwhelming majority of the studies ﬁnd that adjustment
costs are small in relation to the beneﬁts of trade liberalization. Finally, Tybout (2001) reviews
4the plant-level evidence in the light of the new trade theory. Our work is complementary to
his, since our review also extends to the eﬀects of trade reforms on the labor markets and, most
important, it provides a more extensive treatment of the theoretical foundations of empirical work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical predictions concerning
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁrm performance. Section 3 discusses the relevance of these
eﬀects for trade liberalizing developing countries in the light of the micro-level evidence. Section
4 reports the plant-level evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on learning and technology
diﬀusion. Sections 5 and 6 examine the labor market outcomes of trade liberalization. Section 7
analyzes the eﬀects of the 1991 trade liberalization in India. Section 8 concludes.
2 Trade Liberalization and Firm Performance
When markets are imperfectly competitive, trade liberalization may aﬀect ﬁrm-level variables, such
as mark-ups, size and productivity. This section illustrate these eﬀects, while the next reviews the
plant-level evidence on their empirical relevance.
To see how trade liberalization can aﬀect ﬁrm performance, ﬁrst consider a simple setting
with representative ﬁrms.1 Next we will show that more can be learned by allowing for ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Consider then n identical ﬁrms competing ` al aCournot in a sector producing a
homogeneous good. The aggregate demand has a constant elasticity σ. The technology features
plant-level scale economies and is summarized by the following total cost function:




where q is ﬁrm output, f is a ﬁxed overhead cost and 1/ϕ is a constant marginal cost. Both f and
1/ϕ are in terms of labor, the only production factor, chosen as the numeraire. Proﬁt maximization
1This example draws on Markusen (1981). Similar results under diﬀerent assumptions about market structure
can be found in Krugman (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).







Equation (2) is crucial for understanding the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization. It shows
that a ﬁrm’s price-marginal cost mark-up, σn
σn−1, depends negatively on the perceived product
demand elasticity, σn.T h u s ,w h e nﬁrms face a ﬁercer competition due to a rise in the number (n)
of rivals, they perceive a higher demand elasticity and consequently lower their mark-up.
With unrestricted entry, proﬁts (π) are zero in equilibrium:
π =( p − 1/ϕ)q − f =0 ⇒ q = fϕ(σn − 1) (3)
Finally, full employment of labor (L)r e q u i r e s :
L = nl = n(f + q/ϕ)( 4 )

















It can be shown that trade integration among countries with similar tastes and technology is
formally equivalent to an increase in the size of the economy, as captured by an increase in L.T h e
eﬀects on ﬁrm performance are straightforward:
1) Equation (5) shows that trade integration (i.e., a rise in L) raises the number of ﬁrms n.
From (2), this implies that ﬁrms perceive a higher demand elasticity and hence lower their price
and mark-up. This is the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade integration.
2) Trade integration raises ﬁrm size q (see equation (5)).
3) The trade-induced increase in ﬁrm size raises ﬁrm productivity (given by q/l) due to a better
6exploitation of scale economies. This is the scale eﬃciency gain from trade integration.
2.1 Introducing ﬁrm heterogeneity
The above results have been derived from a setting with representative ﬁrms. Several reasons
suggests, however, to extend the general equilibrium trade models to allow for ﬁrm heterogeneity.
In particular:
1) Recent work inter alia by Roberts and Tybout (1996), Olley and Pakes (1996), Aw, Chen and
Roberts (1997) reports evidence of a signiﬁcant degree of within-industry plant-level heterogeneity.
Hence, allowing for ﬁrm heterogeneity may add an important element of realism to the framework
of analysis.
2) Micro-level empirical evidence shows that exporting ﬁrms have diﬀerent characteristics with
respect to non-exporting ﬁrms. In particular, the former are larger, more eﬃcient, more skill-
intensive and pay higher wages (Bernard and Jensen, 1997, 1999; Clerides et al., 1998).
3) Most plant-level empirical studies show that trade-induced productivity gains stemming from
the reshuﬄing of resources between plants with diﬀerent productivity levels are more relevant than
the scale eﬃciency gains due to a better exploitation of plant-level scale economies (Tybout, 2001;
Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002). Therefore, trade models based on representative
ﬁrms may miss an important mechanism through which trade reform aﬀects the allocation of
resources, aggregate productivity and income inequality.
One of the most rigorous attempts to embed ﬁrm heterogeneity into a general equilibrium trade
model is provided by Melitz (2002), who generalizes Krugman (1980) by dropping the assumption
of symmetric ﬁrms2. This model provides new insights on the impact of trade liberalization on the
intra-industry reallocation of resources and can help explain the stylized facts mentioned above.
On the demand side, the model features love for variety, captured by a standard CES util-
2Although Krugman (1980) is a cornerstone of the new trade theory, it is uninteresting (in the absence of ﬁrm
heterogeneity) from the standpoint of the eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁrm performance. The reason is that,
since in this model ﬁrms face a constant demand elasticity, trade integration has no eﬀects on ﬁrms’ mark-ups, and
on their size and productivity.
7ity function, as in Krugman (1980). The production side of the economy is characterized by a
continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent variety. The technology features plant-level scale
economies and is summarized by a total cost function as in equation (1), TC(ϕ)=f + q/ϕ.T h e
only diﬀerence is that now ﬁrms have diﬀerent productivity levels, indexed by ϕ. Hence, ϕ cap-
tures ﬁrm heterogeneity in this model. Firms face a demand curve with a constant elasticity σ > 1.
Proﬁt maximization implies the familiar mark-up pricing rule, p(ϕ)= σ
σ−1
1
ϕ.F i r m s ’ p r o ﬁts are
then π(ϕ)=r(ϕ)/σ − f ,w h e r er(ϕ) is revenue. It can be shown that the ratios of any two ﬁrms’

















Equation (6) and the expressions for p(ϕ)a n dπ(ϕ)s h o wt h a tmore productive ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms
with a higher ϕ) are bigger, charge a lower price and earn higher proﬁts than less productive ﬁrms.
The equilibrium aggregate price index P is a generalization of the standard price index associ-








where µ(ϕ) is the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels and n is the equilibrium number










where e ϕ is the weighted average of ﬁrms’ productivity levels. Note that the inverse of the price
index equals real per capita income W (i.e., W = P−1). Hence, as in Krugman (1980), both
a ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fa v a i l a b l ev a r i e t i e sn and in the average productivity e ϕ raise real
per capita income and welfare. However, while in Krugman (1980) the average productivity is
8exogenously given and trade reform can only exert its eﬀects through an increase in n,i nt h i s
model e ϕ is endogenous and hence it can be inﬂuenced by trade integration.
Melitz shows that in the absence of any trade costs, a move from autarky to free trade has
no eﬀect on the distribution of productivity levels and average productivity. In this case, the
eﬀects of trade integration are identical to those predicted by Krugman (1980), i.e., a welfare
increasing expansion in the product variety, and ﬁrm heterogeneity has no impact on average
industry productivity.
In order to give ﬁrm heterogeneity an important role to play, two routes can be taken. One is
to relax the assumption of an exogenously ﬁxed demand elasticity (σ) for each variety. The other
is to assume the existence of sunk entry costs into foreign markets.
As far as the former is concerned, (in a separate appendix) Melitz shows that, even in the ab-
s e n c eo fa n yt r a d ec o s t s ,ﬁrm heterogeneity is crucial for the impact of trade when ﬁrms’ demand
elasticity endogenously increases with product variety, as in Krugman (1979). In this case, trade
integration among two identical countries expands the variety of products and hence increases the
elasticity of substitution among them. In turn, an increased elasticity of substitution induces a
reallocation of market shares towards more eﬃcient ﬁrms and thus generates an aggregate pro-
ductivity gain. The intuition for this result is that a higher elasticity of substitution generates a
premium in terms of market shares in favor of ﬁrms charging a lower price, i.e., the more eﬃcient
ones.
The second setting carefully explored by Melitz builds on the assumption of sunk entry costs
into foreign markets. Melitz refers to the results of empirical studies conﬁrming that ﬁrms face
signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs associated with the entry into foreign markets: “These costs are related to
t h ef a c tt h a taﬁrm must ﬁnd and inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about the
foreign market. Further, it must adapt its product to foreign standards and set up new distribution
channels in the foreign country”.
9The assumption that exporting ﬁrms face a ﬁxed cost of exporting has striking implications.3
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁrm heterogeneity, only the more eﬃcient ones can aﬀord to pay the ﬁxed cost of
exporting. Hence, these costs generate a partition of ﬁrms into exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms.
The former sell to both the domestic and the foreign markets, whereas the latter only sell to the
domestic market. Hence, this partition of ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a te x p o r t i n gﬁrms are larger and more
productive than non-exporting ﬁr m s ,a n dt h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eplant-level empirical evidence.
This setting based on ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁxed costs of exporting can help explain the eﬀects
of trade liberalization on intra-industry reallocation of resources and aggregate productivity. In
particular, it allows to explain the empirical ﬁnding that output share reallocations among ﬁrms
with diﬀerent productivity levels are the main source of trade-induced productivity gains. The
intuition is the following. In the trade regime, all domestic ﬁrms face foreign competition in their
domestic market, which induces a loss of revenue and market share. For non-exporting ﬁrms this
translates into a loss of proﬁts. Among these non-exporting ﬁrms, the less eﬃcient incur negative
proﬁts and exit, whereas the other non-exporting ﬁrms survive with a lower market share than in
autarky. Conversely, exporting ﬁrms expand their market share and proﬁts because their access to
foreign markets more than compensate the loss of revenue in the domestic market. Hence, trade
induces both the exit of less eﬃcient ﬁrms and the reallocation of market shares towards the more
eﬃcient exporting ﬁrms. Both eﬀects contribute to an increase in average productivity.
3In section 5 we will see that, as shown by Manasse and Turrini (2001), the interaction of ﬁxed costs of exporting
and ﬁrm heterogeneity has also striking implications with regard to the eﬀects of trade liberalization on wage
inequality.
103 Evidence on the Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization on Firm
Performance4
3.1 Evidence on the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization
The pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization has traditionally been investigated by using
industry-level data. This literature examines the correlation between trade exposure and price-
cost margins at the industry level, using import penetration rates as a measure of trade exposure.
Empirical studies for industrial countries (see, for instance, Schmalensee, 1989) show a negative
correlation between price-costs margins and import competition, especially when domestic con-
centration is high. This result is consistent with the argument that import competition reduces
proﬁts in industries which enjoy above normal returns.
As for the developing world, the country studies reported in Roberts and Tybout (1996), relative
to Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco and Turkey, add to the standard industry-level analysis a
study of the correlation between trade exposure and price cost-margins at the plant-level, to see
whether the observed eﬀects at the industry-level are common to all producers in an industry or
are concentrated in a subset of producers.5
3.1.1 Industry-level evidence
As far as the industry-level analysis is concerned, the country studies use the industry-level price-
cost margin to measure industry-level performance. It is immediate to show that, if we assume that
unit expenditures on labor and materials are constant with respect to output, then the price-cost
margin is a monotonic transformation of the price-marginal cost mark-up. The price-cost margin
in industry j at time t, PCMjt, is measured as the value of output (PjtQjt) minus expenditures
on labor and materials over the value of output. It equals proﬁts (Πjt) plus payments to capital
4See also Tybout (2001) on the topics covered in this section.
5The authors of the country studies reported in Roberts and Tybout (1996) are: J. Tybout for Chile (ch.9), M.
Roberts for Colombia (ch.10), J.-M. Grether for Mexico (ch.11), M. Haddad, J. de Melo and B. Horton for Morocco
(ch.12) and F. Foroutan for Turkey (ch.13).
11as a proportion of the industry’s value of output:
PCM jt =( Πjt +( rt + δ)Kjt)/PjtQjt (9)
where Kjt is capital stock, rt is the competitive gross return on capital and δ is the depreciation
rate. Equation (9) shows that sectoral PCMs are inﬂu e n c e db yb o t ht h er a t eo fp r o ﬁta n dt h e
capital intensity. The country studies use the following basic model:
PCMjt = f(Hjt,IMP jt,H jt · IMPjt,K jt/Qjt,I j,T t) (10)
Here, Hjt is the Herﬁndahl index, an index of industry structure which is inversely correlated
with the degree of competition among domestic producers. IMPjt is the import penetration
ratio; the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization should show up as a negative correlation
between the price-cost margin and import penetration. The interaction term Hjt·IMPjt tests the
hypothesis that, if highly concentrated industries enjoy above normal proﬁts because of market
power, then they should be more sensitive to foreign competition. Kjt/Qjt is the capital-output
ratio, which controls for sectoral diﬀerences in capital-intensity (see equation (9)). Finally, Ij and
Tt are industry and time dummies, respectively.
Since most of variation in the panel data used in these country studies is across industries, it
is not surprising that the estimation results crucially depend on whether or not industry dummies
are included in the regression equation. When industry dummies are excluded, four out of ﬁve
countries studies (i.e., those for Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Morocco) ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients
of both IMPjt and Hjt · IMPjt are negative and highly signiﬁcant. This suggests that import
competition is negatively correlated with sectoral proﬁtability and that the eﬀect is larger for
highly concentrated industries.
These results are substantially weakened, however, when industry dummies are included in the
regression equation. Note that in this case estimated coeﬃcients only reﬂect temporal variation in
12the data, and hence they are better suited to isolate the pro-competitive eﬀect of increased foreign
competition. The country studies show that, when industry dummies are included, evidence of a
signiﬁcant pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization is found only in Colombia and Mexico.
3.1.2 Plant-level evidence
The country studies also examine the pro-competitive eﬀect of foreign competition by looking at
plant-level evidence on price-costs margins. They use the following basic model:
PCM ijt = f(Sijt,S2
ijt,IMP jt,S ijt · IMPjt,K jt/Qjt,I j,T t) (11)
where PCM ijt is the price-cost margin of plant i in industry j and time t, Sijt is the share of plant
i’s output in sector j’s total domestic production, and the other variables in (11) have the same
interpretation as in equation (10). The interaction term Sijt · IMPjt tests the hypothesis that
the pro-competitive eﬀect of foreign competition is stronger among ﬁrms with a higher domestic
market share.
The coeﬃcient of the linear term Sijt is generally positive and signiﬁcant, whereas that of the
quadratic term S2
ijt is generally negative. This suggests that price-costs margins rise at a decreasing
rate with market shares. More interestingly, in every country studied the coeﬃcients on IMPjt
and Sijt · IMPjt are negative and highly signiﬁcant, whereas industry dummies do not generally
have any explanatory power. Thus, exposure to foreign competition is associated with lower price-
cost margins, and the eﬀect is concentrated among the large plants. This result suggests that
looking at plant-level evidence highlights a powerful and systematic pro-competitive role of foreign
competition.
3.2 Plant-level evidence on trade-induced productivity gains
The literature which uses plant-level data to investigate the productivity gains from trade liberal-
ization shows mixed results. Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991) ﬁnd little evidence of productivity
13growth in manufacturing after trade reform in Chile. Conversely, Harrison (1994) ﬁnds a signif-
icant productivity increase after trade liberalization in Cote d’Ivoire. In section 7, we show that
empirical works using a similar methodology ﬁnd opposite results with regard to the eﬀects of
the 1991 trade liberalization in India. In this section, we brieﬂy review two recent studies which
will help us clarify the methodological hurdles involved in estimating the eﬀect of trade reform on
productivity.
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) use plant-level panel data to study the eﬃciency gains induced by
the Mexico trade liberalization. Prior to 1985, Mexico was an inward-looking economy due to heavy
policies of trade protection.6 In 1985, the Mexican government announced its decision to join the
GATT and undertook major reforms leading to a reduction in tariﬀs by 45% and import licenses by
more than 75% within three years. Hence, the Mexican experience provides an interesting setting
to study the empirical relevance of trade-induced productivity gains in developing countries.
The methodology employed by Tybout and Westbrook allows them to disentangle three poten-
tial sources of productivity gains. The ﬁrst derives from exploitation of scale economies. As shown
in Section 2, trade integration, by increasing the perceived product demand elasticity, causes ﬁrms
to loose market power and forces them down their average cost curves, thereby inducing scale
eﬃciency gains. The second source of productivity gains derives from market share reallocations
among plants with diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency. As shown in Section 2, in the presence of sub-
stantial ﬁrm heterogeneity, market share reallocations can be a relevant source of trade-induced
productivity gains. Finally, the authors include a catch-all residual term which captures changes
in productivity not accounted for by scale eﬀects or share reallocations, such as technical change,
learning-by-doing, externalities, capacity utilization, elimination of waste, managerial eﬀort, and
so on. The main ﬁndings of Tybout and Westbrook are the following.
a) Scale eﬃciency eﬀects. Most manufacturing sectors show increasing returns to scale, and for
the smallest plants in these industries returns to scale are often relevant (as high as 1.2). However,
6The data used by the authors are from Mexico’s Annual Industrial Survey and cover the period 1984 through
1990. The sample plants represent 80% of total output.
14the largest plants in these industries generally appear to have reached a minimum eﬃcient scale.
Thus, given that large plants account for a disproportionate share of sectoral output, industrial
expansion does not induce large gains in scale eﬃciency. More precisely, the mean output growth
was more than 50% in the period 1984-1990. But despite this substantial output growth, the
exploitation of scale economies accounts for only the 0.55% rise in average productivity. These
results suggest that the focus of trade models with imperfect competition and representative ﬁrms
on the gains from scale economies exploitation may be somewhat misplaced, since these gains
appear modest in magnitude.
b) Output share reallocations.T h i se ﬀect accounts for more than 1% rise in average productivity.
Although this ﬁgure is quite modest, it suggests that output share reallocations among ﬁrms
with diﬀerent productivity levels might be empirically more relevant than scale eﬃciency eﬀects,
and hence that ﬁrm heterogeneity can be a key determinant of the eﬃciency gains from trade
liberalization.
c) Residual eﬀect. Most of the average increase in productivity comes from the catch-all residual
eﬀect, which accounts for 9.6% rise in average productivity. This implies that most of the estimated
overall eﬃciency gains (11.16%) are indeed left unexplained.
The above results must be interpreted with caution, because of the hurdles involved in the
methodology used by Tybout and Westbrook, which are common, however, to most analyses
of the eﬃciency gains from trade liberalization. The main methodological problems involved in
estimating the productivity gains from trade reform can be summarized as follows (see Pavcnik,
2002).
1) Identiﬁcation of the trade eﬀects. In most studies, the identiﬁcation of trade eﬀects relies on
the comparison of plant productivity before and after a trade policy change. As a consequence,
this approach attributes productivity changes originating from other sources to trade policy. To
see how serious this problem can be, note that most studies use data covering only a short time
period after trade reform, which implies that the estimates of productivity growth can be heavily
15aﬀected by the cyclical behavior of the economy in the aftermath of the reform. Note, further, that
in some episodes of trade liberalization, a deep economic downturn is often the trigger of these
reforms, and hence productivity gains from liberalization can be underestimated if a prolonged
recession leads to reduced capacity utilization.
2) Simultaneity bias.A s s u m e t h a t p l a n t i’s technology is described by the following Cobb-
Douglas production function:





it + eit; eit = ωit + ²it (12)
where all variables are in logarithms, yit is output and x
j
it is the jth input. The error term eit
is composed of a stochastic disturbance ²it plus an unobserved plant-speciﬁce ﬃciency term ωit.
Note that, since more productive plants are willing to hire more inputs, the error term eit is
positively correlated with factor inputs. This implies that OLS estimates (or between estimates,
as in Tybout and Westbrook, 1995) of the production function coeﬃcients are biased upward, thus
involving biased estimates of ωit.7
In some cases (e.g., in Harrison, 1994) this problem has been tackled by assuming that the
plant-speciﬁce ﬃciency term is time-invariant, which allows to estimate equation (12) using a
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. This approach only removes the bias originating from the time-invariant
component of plant-speciﬁce ﬃciency, so it does not solve the problem completely. What is more
worrisome, however, is that this approach, by treating plant-speciﬁce ﬃciency as time-invariant,
also removes the possibility to measure how it evolves after trade reform.
Hence, in general, the simultaneity problem is either neglected or tackled improperly in the
literature.
3) Self-selection bias. The literature generally neglects the self-selection bias induced by plant
closing. Pavcnik (2002) shows that, under certain conditions, a negative correlation is to be
7Estimates of ωit are in fact based on the diﬀerence between actual output and output predicted from estimates
of the production function coeﬃcients.
16expected between the eﬃciency term ωit and capital stock, conditional on surviving plants. This
implies that the estimated coeﬃcient of capital stock in production function (12) is generally biased
downward.
Pavcnik (2002) proposes an alternative methodology which addresses most of these issues. In
particular, the problem of identiﬁcation of the trade eﬀects is addressed by comparing plants’ pro-
ductivity growth in the export oriented and import competing sectors with that of ﬁrms in the
non-traded sector. The simultaneity and self-selection biases are addressed by using a semipara-
metric procedure in which the plant-speciﬁce ﬃciency term is modeled as a time-varying function
of capital and investment.
Pavcnik implements her methodology using data on Chilean manufacturing plants for the period
1979 to 1986, i.e., in the aftermath of a drastic trade liberalization. Plants are partitioned into
three groups. Plants belonging to a 4-digit ISIC industry exporting more than 15% of its total
output are characterized as export oriented. Plants belonging to an industry whose ratio of imports
to total output exceed 15% are instead characterized as import competing. The rest of the plants
belong to the non-traded sector.
Pavcnik uses the mentioned procedure to obtain consistent estimates of plants’ productivity
growth in each of these groups. The results are striking. In the period 1979-1986, the productivity
of export oriented plants grew, on average, by 25.4%, that of import competing plants grew by
even more (31.9%), while that of plants in the non-traded sector grew by only 6.2%. These results
suggest a dramatic productivity growth diﬀerential in favor of plants exposed to international
competition with respect to inward-oriented plants. They also suggest that, in the case of a
unilateral trade liberalization (such as the one experienced by Chile), trade-induced productivity
gains can be higher for import competing plants relative to export oriented plants.
Pavcnik also uses a procedure similar to that used by Tybout and Westbrook (1995) to dis-
entangle the contribution of output share reallocations among ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity
levels to productivity growth. She ﬁnds that in the export oriented sector, average productivity
17growth due to output share reallocations equals 16.6%, while the rest (8.7%) is due to within
plants productivity growth. The ﬁgures for the import competing sector and the non-traded sector
are, respectively, 21.3% and 10.7%, and 2.4% and 3.8%. These results strongly suggest that the
reshuﬄing of resources in favor of more productive ﬁrms is a critical determinant of productivity
growth and that, consistent with Melitz (2002)’s model, this eﬀect can be largely due to trade
liberalization.
3 . 3 M o r eo nt r a d ep o l i c ya n ds c a l ee ﬃciency
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) also look at patterns of sectoral change in measures of foreign
competition to see whether they are correlated with estimated productivity changes. Correlations
are generally insigniﬁcant. The only robust ﬁnding is that heightened import competition reduces
scale eﬃciency. This result seems to contradict one of the main predictions of the simplest models of
the new trade theory (such as the one illustrated in Section 2), i.e., that in the presence of imperfect
competition the trade-induced increase in ﬁr ms i z ec a nb ea ni m p o r t a n ts o u r c eo fe ﬃciency gains.
Indeed, most general equilibrium models based on imperfect competition (see, for instance, Cox
and Harris, 1985) predict that trade liberalization will generate welfare gains primarily through
the mechanism of increased scale.
The empirical evidence on the eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁrm size is mixed. Roberts and
Tybout (1991) ﬁnd that higher import penetration is associated with lower employment per plant
in Chile and Colombia. Conversely, other works on developed countries ﬁnd that the removal of
tariﬀ protection increases output.8
The theoretical literature emphasizes that the eﬀects of trade policy in the presence of imperfect
competition are generally sensitive to the speciﬁc assumptions concerning market structure and
industry characteristics. Following Head and Ries (1999), now we argue that a slight modiﬁcation
of the simple model illustrated in Section 2 can help explain the ﬁnding of Tybout and Westbrook
8See, for instance, Baldwin and Gorecki (1986) and Caves (1984) for an analysis of average plant scale in Canada
and Australia, respectively.
18(1995) that increased import competition may reduce ﬁrm size and scale eﬃciency.
Consider n domestic ﬁrms and n∗ foreign ﬁrms competing ` al aCournot in an industry producing
a homogeneous good. Domestic and foreign ﬁrms employ the same production technology, featuring
a ﬁxed cost f and a constant marginal cost 1/φ. Markets are segmented, as in Brander (1981). Let
τh and τf denote the ad valorem tariﬀs charged by the domestic and foreign country, respectively.
The proﬁts of domestic and foreign ﬁrms (π and π∗, respectively) are given by:
π =( ph − 1/φ)qh +( pf/(1 + τf) − 1/φ)qf − f (13)
π∗ =( ph/(1 + τh) − 1/φ)q∗
h +( pf − 1/φ)q∗
f − f
Here, qh and q∗
h denote, respectively, domestic and foreign ﬁrms’ sales to the domestic market,
whereas qf and q∗
f are domestic and foreign ﬁrms’ sales to the foreign market, respectively. ph and
pf are the ﬁnal consumer prices in the domestic and foreign market, respectively.
Since the two markets are segmented (and marginal costs are constant), a ﬁrm’s choice of
output in one market is independent of its choice of output in the other market. Hence we can
concentrate on the domestic market to study the impact of τh on qh and q∗
h, noting that the impact
of τf on qf is analogous to that of τh on q∗
h.T h eﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization in










h + ph − (1 + τh)/φ =0
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (14) with respect to qh, q∗
h and τh, using Cramer’s rule and







19Inequalities in (15) show that a home tariﬀ raises output per ﬁrm in the domestic country and
lowers output per ﬁrm in the foreign country. Similarly, a foreign tariﬀ raises output per ﬁrm in
the foreign country and lowers output per ﬁrm in the domestic country. The intuition is that a
home tariﬀ raises the marginal cost of foreign exporting ﬁrms, forcing them to lower output to
raise marginal revenue and restore the equality between marginal cost and marginal revenue. In
turn, foreign ﬁrms’ contraction allows domestic ﬁrms to expand.
To sum up, competition ` al aCournot in the context of segmented markets implies that unilateral
trade liberalization by the domestic country reduces ﬁrm size and scale eﬃciency in the domestic
country and raises scale eﬃciency in the foreign country.9 This result may help explain why
empirical studies often ﬁnd that increased import competition due to unilateral trade liberalization
reduces ﬁrm size in developing countries.
Head and Ries (1999) test the implications of this model using a panel of 230 Canadian 4-digit
SIC industries for the period 1987-1994. The focus of their empirical analysis is on the eﬀects on
ﬁrm size of the 1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which led to a gradual bilateral tariﬀ
removal between the two countries. Their basic regression equation is:
lnqit = αi + βt + γCAτCA
it + γUSτUS
it + ²it (16)
where qit is average output per plant in the ith industry at time t, αi and βt are industry and time
ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, τCA
it and τUS
it are the industry tariﬀ rates charged by the Canadian and
U.S. governments, respectively, and ²it is an error term. Regression results show that Canadian
tariﬀ reductions lowered plant scale in Canada, while U.S. tariﬀ reductions had the opposite eﬀect.
Both eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant and quite large in magnitude. For instance, estimated coeﬃcients
imply that the average reduction of Canadian tariﬀs by of 5.4% caused a 6.1% scale reduction in
Canada, while the average reduction of U.S. tariﬀs by 2.8% caused a 4.6% scale increase in Canada.
An other interesting result is that tariﬀ eﬀects are smaller in industries characterized by high
9Head and Ries (1999) show that this result holds also under the assumption of free entry of ﬁrms.
20turnover rates (measured as the sum of entry and exit divided by the number of establishments).
This suggests that plant entry and exit dampen scale adjustments, and hence that industries
characterized by free entry and exit are not much aﬀected by tariﬀ reductions. This result is in
line with results reported by Roberts and Tybout (1991) for Chile and Colombia, showing that the
eﬀect of import penetration on employees per plant decreases with industry turnover.
Head and Ries also look at plant size heterogeneity to examine whether plants belonging to
diﬀerent size groups show a diﬀerent response to trade policy changes. Their main result is that
only the scale of large plants is responsive to tariﬀ reductions. Conversely, small plants are de
facto insulated from the eﬀects of trade liberalization.
To sum up, the plant-level evidence illustrated in this section suggests that trade-induced scale
eﬃciency gains are generally small in magnitude, because: 1) a disproportionate share of industry
output is produced by large ﬁrms, which appear to have reached minimum eﬃcient scale; 2) small
plants’ output does not respond much to tariﬀ reductions; 3) entry and exit of ﬁrms in response
to changing proﬁt opportunities lower the quantity adjustment by incumbent ﬁr m si ns e c t o r sw i t h
high turnover rates. The evidence also shows that unilateral trade liberalization generally reduces
ﬁrm size and scale eﬃciency in import competing sectors. This is not a worrisome result, however,
since the evidence also shows that, notwithstanding this negative eﬀect, overall trade-induced
productivity gains are higher in import competing sectors.
4 Trade and Technology Advancement
In addition to the static eﬀects illustrated in Section 2, trade liberalization has also been argued
to have other static and dynamic eﬀects, most of which are related to knowledge diﬀusion and
technology advancement. Here we brieﬂyr e v i e ws o m eo ft h e s ee ﬀects.
Imports of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs and capital goods
As ﬁrst shown by Ethier (1982), in the presence of ﬁrm-level scale economies, free trade in
diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs is formally equivalent to technical progress. The reason is that
21imports of intermediates allow a ﬁner division of labor which increases ﬁrms’ eﬃciency. A similar
reasoning applies to imports of diﬀerentiated capital goods. Further, through imports of interme-
diates and capital goods, domestic ﬁrms can beneﬁt from foreign innovations incorporated in these
goods. This argument is particularly relevant for developing countries. In a dynamic extension of
Ethier (1982)’s model, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) have also shown that, under certain con-
ditions (indeed quite restrictive), trade in diﬀerentiated intermediates can permanently increase
the rate of innovation and growth. Finally, as shown by Lee (1993), if capital goods are capital-
intensive, then trade liberalization reduces the price of capital goods in capital-poor developing
countries, thereby increasing the return to investment and the growth rate of capital stock in these
countries; similarly, trade liberalization reduces the price of imported technology in developing
countries, thereby stimulating technology advancement.
Foreign direct investment
Foreign investment can generate several beneﬁts for the host country. For instance, it can
ﬁnance the expansion of industries in which the domestic country enjoys a comparative advantage.
Further, it can lead to the transfer of knowledge from foreign to local ﬁrms. Finally, it can provide
local ﬁrms with the critical know-how to break into foreign markets.
If foreign entrants possess a better technology, they can foster productivity improvements in the
domestic industry either directly, by raising the productivity of the resources used in production,
either indirectly through knowledge spillovers to local ﬁrms. As far as the latter eﬀect is concerned,
local ﬁrms can learn from foreign ﬁrms either by simply observing them, or through turnover of
labor, as employees move from foreign to local ﬁrms.
Learning by exporting
It is often argued, mainly on the basis of anecdotal evidence, that there are several channels
through which domestic exporters can beneﬁt from the technical expertise of foreign buyers.10 In
particular, breaking into foreign markets allows ﬁrms to acquire knowledge of international best
10See, inter alia, World Bank (1993).
22practice. Further, foreign buyers often provide their suppliers with technical assistance and product
design in order to improve the quality of imported goods. It has also been noted that in some
cases foreign buyers transmit to their suppliers located in low-wage countries the tacit knowledge
acquired from their other suppliers located in technologically advanced countries. Hence, exporting
may foster learning and productivity growth.
Aside from these beneﬁcial eﬀects, trade liberalization has also been argued to have potentially
negative dynamic eﬀects for developing countries. These negative eﬀects can be thought of as the
dynamic counterpart to the static gains from specialization based on comparative advantage. For
instance, as shown by Lucas (1988) and Young (1991), in the presence of sectoral asymmetries in
the relevance of learning-by-doing, a developingc o u n t r yw h i c hi nt h ef r e et r a d er e g i m es w i t c h e s
its production mix toward technologically stagnant sectors may suﬀer a permanent reduction in
its rate of productivity growth. Similarly, Grossman and Helpman (1991) have shown that trade
liberalization can adversely aﬀect the rate of innovation and growth in a human capital-poor
developing country by diverting its resources away from R&D. Further, Rodrik (1988) argues that,
if ﬁrms invest in superior technology to reduce their costs, then their incentive to invest depends
positively on output. It follows that trade liberalization may reduce the incentive to invest in new
technology for ﬁrms belonging to the import competing sectors, since these sectors should contract
after trade liberalization.
In the previous section, we have already shown that there is evidence of trade-induced produc-
tivity gains in the developing world, and that these gains are larger for import competing ﬁrms.
Hence, the available micro-level evidence suggests that the potentially negative eﬀects of trade
reforms are actually oﬀset by their positive eﬀects. In section 7, we will report more micro-level
evidence on the eﬀe c t so ft r a d er e f o r mi nI n d i a .I nt h er e s to ft h i ss e c t i o n ,w ed i s c u s st h ee m p i r i c a l
relevance of some of the mentioned channels of international technology diﬀusion.
234.1 The import channel of technology diﬀusion11
In the absence of plant-level studies on the link between imports and productivity growth, here we
brieﬂy discuss the evidence based on more aggregated data. Coe and Helpman (1995) is one of the
ﬁrst attempts to perform a rigorous test of the relevance of imports as a vehicle for the international
transmission of technology. Using a sample of OECD countries, these authors ask how much of
a country’s total factor productivity can be explained by domestic and foreign R&D activities,
where the latter is crucially deﬁned as the import share-weighted average of partner countries’
R&D activities. Coe and Helpman ﬁnd that both domestic and foreign R&D have a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on domestic TFP. Further, for small countries (only), the TFP elasticity to foreign
R&D is signiﬁcantly larger than that to domestic R&D. Similarly, using patent data, Eaton and
Kortum (1996) ﬁnd that innovations that originate abroad explain more than 90% of productivity
growth of small OECD countries, and that more than half of these innovations originate from only
three countries, i.e., the U.S., Japan and Germany.
Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister (1997) extend their analysis to a large sample of developing
countries. One important diﬀerence is that import shares are computed by considering imports
of machinery and equipment only, since these goods are more likely to embody new knowledge.
Their results strongly suggest that intermediate goods imports raise total factor productivity also
in developing countries. Meyer (2001) restricts even further the deﬁnition of imports used to
compute import shares by considering machinery only and ﬁnds that in this case the TFP elasticity
to foreign R&D in developing countries is twice as large as in the case in which all imports are
used to compute foreign R&D.
A recent paper by Barba Navaretti and Soloaga (2002) looks at the role of imported machines in
transferring embodied technological progress. They use data on unit values of machines exported by
the EU to a sample of neighboring developing and transition countries in Central-Eastern Europe
and in the Southern Mediterranean. Here, unit values proxy for the technological complexity
11See also Barba Navaretti and Tarr (2000) and Keller (2001a) for two recent surveys of interna-
tional trade and technology diﬀusion.
24of machines. The authors ﬁnd that imported machines have a positive impact on total factor
productivity, and that the impact is larger the higher the technological complexity of imported
machines.
The above studies examine the link between TFP, R&D and imports at the aggregate level.
However, as noted by Keller (2001b), R&D spending is highly concentrated by industry. For in-
stance, about 80% of total manufacturing R&D is conducted in only four 3-digit ISIC industries in
OECD countries (chemical products, electrical and non-electrical machinery and transport equip-
ment). Therefore, Keller performs separate regressions for the sample of low-R&D industries and
ﬁnds that TFP elasticities are signiﬁcantly smaller in these industries.
To sum up, preliminary evidence using aggregate data suggests that imports are a highly
relevant channel of international technology diﬀusion, and that the domestic productivity eﬀect of
knowledge originating abroad is greater the smaller the size and the lower the level of development of
the domestic country, and the greater both the technology intensity of industries and the complexity
of imported machines.
4.2 Foreign direct investment
Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1994) and Harrison (1996) are among the ﬁrst
to use plant-level panel data to analyze the impact of joint ventures and foreign subsidiaries on
local ﬁrms’ productivity in developing countries. These studies ask two related questions, namely,
whether foreign ﬁrms exhibit higher productivity levels than local ﬁrms, and whether knowledge
spillovers from foreign to local ﬁrms raise the latter’s productivity level. Data come from three
developing countries, Cote d’Ivoire (1975-87), Morocco (1985-89) and Venezuela (1983-88). Foreign
ﬁrms are deﬁned as all ﬁrms with foreign equity that exceed 5% of assets.
As far as the performance of foreign relative to local ﬁrms is concerned, these studies ﬁnd that,
consistent with other evidence, foreign ﬁrms generally exhibit higher total factor productivity, pay
25higher wages and have much higher import and export propensities.12
A more interesting question is whether local ﬁrms beneﬁt from spillovers generated by their
foreign counterparts. Aitken and Harrison (1994) test this hypothesis by assuming that, if knowl-
edge is transmitted from foreign to local ﬁrms, then the productivity of the latter should be higher
in sectors with a larger foreign presence. They use a panel of Venezuelan ﬁrms to estimate the
following Cobb-Douglas production function:
logYijt =l o gAijt + a1 logSLijt + a2 logULijt + a3 logMijt + a4 logKijt (17)
Here, Yijt is output of ﬁrm i in sector j at time t, A is total factor productivity, SL is skilled labor,
ULis unskilled labor, M is raw materials, and K is capital stock. In order to capture the eﬀect of
foreign presence on local ﬁrms’ TFP, A is modeled as follows:
logAijt = b1 + b2FDIjt + b3Dj + b4Dt + eit (18)
where FDIjt is the share of foreign ﬁrms (as measured by the share of foreign assets in total sector
assets) in sector j at time t, Dj and Dt are sector and time dummies, respectively, and eit is an
error term. A positive eﬀect of foreign presence on local ﬁrms’ TFP should show up as a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient b2.
Estimation results critically depend on whether or not sectoral dummies Dj are included in the
regression. When sectoral dummies are excluded, the coeﬃcient b2 is positive and signiﬁcant. This
suggests a positive correlation between foreign presence and local ﬁrms’ eﬃciency. The correlation
may be spurious, however, since foreign ﬁrms may be attracted to sectors in which local ﬁrms
make higher proﬁts. In fact, when controlling for unobserved ﬁxed industry characteristics through
sectoral dummies, b2 turns negative and highly signiﬁcant. Notice that in this case only temporal
12The evidence on total factor productivity growth is mixed. In particular, only in the case of Venezuela TFP
growth is higher for foreign ﬁr m s . T h ec o n v e r s ei st r u ef o rM e x i c o ,a n dt h ed i ﬀerence is insigniﬁcant for Cote
d’Ivoire.
26v a r i a t i o ni nt h eFDI variable is exploited to estimate b2, which suggests that increased foreign
presence has a negative short-run impact on local ﬁrms’ productivity. One possible explanation
for this result is that foreign ﬁrms reduce the market share of local ﬁrms, thereby reducing their
capacity utilization. Another possibility is that foreign ﬁrms, by paying higher wages, attract the
best workers, thereby reducing the productivity of local ﬁrms.
4.3 Learning by exporting?
The micro-level evidence shows a positive robust correlation between exporting and productivity.
There are two plausible non incompatible explanations for this stylized fact. One is that, as shown
by Melitz (2002) and discussed in Section 2, more eﬃcient ﬁrms self-select into export markets.
The other is the learning-by-exporting argum e n t ,a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c he x p o r t i n gc a u s e se ﬃciency
gains. Two recent papers address the question of the direction of causality. Bernard and Jensen
(1999) use data relative to U.S. manufacturing plants for the period 1984-1992. They ﬁnd that
size, wages, productivity and capital intensity are all higher for exporters relative to non-exporters.
They also ﬁnd clear evidence that good ﬁrms become exporters, since performance is higher ex-
ante for exporters. However, they do not ﬁnd evidence that exporting improves performance, since
productivity and wage growth are not higher ex-post for exporters relative non-exporters.
Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) address the same question and reach similar results. They use
plant-level manufacturing data for Colombia (1981-1991), Mexico (1986-1990) and Morocco (1984-
1991). Their approach is based on the idea that, if exporting fosters productivity growth, then
the productivity trajectory of exporting ﬁrms should change after they break into foreign markets.
To test this hypothesis, they estimate econometrically the reduced form of a theoretical model
derived from the hysteresis literature (Baldwin, 1989; Dixit, 1989) which explicitly considers two
possible explanations for the correlation between exporting and productivity, namely, self-selection
and learning-by-exporting.
In particular, they estimate, industry by industry, by full information maximum likelihood
27(FIML), the following two-equations system:
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Equation (19) represents the export market participation decision by plant i at time t.I t i s a
dynamic discrete choice equation in which yit takes a value of one if the ﬁrm decides to export
and a value of zero otherwise. Here, Xit is a vector of exogenous plant characteristics, et is the
real exchange rate (which proxies for changes in relative prices that are common to all plants), the
summation of the terms AV Cit−j is a distributed lag in the average variable cost (which proxies for
marginal cost), the summation of the terms yit−j is a distributed lag in the participation variable,
and ηit is a disturbance.13 This equation allows to test whether, after controlling for plant-speciﬁc
characteristics, for movements in industry relative prices and for past export participation decisions,
past realizations of marginal costs are negatively correlated with the decision to break into foreign
markets. If this is the case, we can conclude that, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms experiencing a productivity
increase (as proxied by a fall in marginal costs) are more likely to be exporters.
For all countries and for most industries, FIML estimation results show that the sum of co-
eﬃcients of the distributed lag in marginal costs is negative. Individual coeﬃcients are never
signiﬁcant, however, (maybe because of the high collinearity among them) and some of them are
positive. In sum, these results provide weak evidence in favor of the hypothesis that ﬁrms improving
their relative performance self-select into foreign markets.14
Equation (20) allows to test the learning-by-exporting hypothesis: if ﬁrms experience cost
reductions after entering foreign markets, then, after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in
13In both equations, the disturbances are composed of unobserved plant random eﬀects plus transitory noise.
14FIML estimation results also show that, in all countries and all industries, ﬁrms with large capital stocks are
more likely to become exporters. Further, ﬁrms with past export experience are more likely to be exporters. This
latter result is consistent with the literature on hysteresis.
28capital stock (Kit−j) and in past realization of marginal costs, we should observe a negative
correlation between export experience and marginal costs. FIML estimation results show, however,
that the coeﬃcients γ
y
j on lagged export experience are generally insigniﬁcant. In some cases they
are signiﬁcant, but with the wrong (positive) sign. Only in a few cases these coeﬃcients are
negative and signiﬁcant, e.g., in the Moroccan apparel and leather industries.15
In short, these results do not support the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. There are several
reasons, however, to be cautious in interpreting the results. In particular, since the time span
covered by the data is very short, the econometric analysis can only pick up gains in eﬃciency
which materialize in the short-run (within three years). Further, even if these gains materialize
immediately (which is quite unlikely, given that learning is a gradual process), in the short-run
they can be oﬀset by the sunk entry costs associated with becoming an exporter. Indeed, sunk
entry costs may contribute to explain the positive and signiﬁcant correlation between exporting
and marginal costs found by the authors in some cases. Hence, this evidence simply suggests that
becoming an exporter does not generate short-run eﬃciency gains.16
5 Trade, Technology and Wage Inequality in Developing
Countries
According to the traditional trade theory, trade liberalization should pose no serious distributional
issues in developing countries. The reason is that, since developing countries are high-skilled labor
scarce relative to industrial countries, their trade-induced specialization in low-skilled intensive ac-
tivities should increase the relative demand for low-skilled labor, thereby reducing wage inequality
in these countries. This prediction has often been used to argue in favor of trade liberalization
in developing countries, since it would both increase eﬃciency and lower wage dispersion in these
15FIML estimation results of equation (20) also show that ﬁrms with a larger capital stock have lower marginal
costs, and that marginal costs tend to follow a second order autoregressive process.
16Also, as correctly noted by the authors, their approach does not allow to detect eﬃciency gains accruing to
workers in the form of higher wages, but that leave average variable costs unchanged.
29countries.
The empirical evidence on wage inequality in developing countries seems to contradict this
optimistic prediction.17 As shown, inter alia, by Robbins (1996) and Harrison and Hanson (1999),
many developing countries experiencing drastic trade liberalizations in the recent past, such as
Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica and Uruguay, have seen a concomitant increase in wage inequality and
a generalized increase in the relative demand for skilled labor (i.e., skill upgrading).
This puzzling evidence has stimulated an impressive body of research by way of new explana-
t i o n so ft h el i n kb e t w e e nt r a d ea n dl a b o rm a r k e t s .H e r ew eb r i e ﬂy review the main explanations,
focusing on their implications for labor market outcomes in developing countries.
Outsourcing
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) formulate a model with capital mobility and a continuum of pro-
duction activities with diﬀerent skill-intensities. They show that trade and investment liberal-
ization bring about North-South outsourcing of production activities which are at the same time
unskill-intensive relative to other activities performed in the North, and skill-intensive relative to
activities performed in the South. The main implication is that, contrary to the standard two-
sector Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade and investment liberalization increase the relative demand for
skilled labor in both regions, and can thus potentially explain the worldwide increase in the skill
premia.
The argument put forth by Feenstra and Hanson is consistent with the main stylized facts
concerning the labor market dynamics in both the developed and the developing world. Its empir-
ical relevance deserves further scrutiny, however. As argued, for instance, by Robbins (1996), this
model can be relevant for countries, such as Mexico, that experienced large FDI inﬂows in the last
17The prediction is based on the simple Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, as noted by Turrini (2002), in a
more realistic higher dimensional setting, i.e., in the presence of many countries, sectors and production factors,
it is hard to discern empirically in which factor a country is relatively abundant and in which trade context that
factor is going to gain from trade liberalization. For instance, Turrini performs computable general equilibrium
simulations to show that the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the relative wage of the unskilled in Latin America
critically depends on whether or not agriculture is also liberalized. A similar point is made by Harrison and Hanson
(1999). They argue that the dramatic increase in wage inequality after the 1985 trade reform in Mexico does not
necessarily contradict the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The reason is that, prior to reform, protection in Mexico was
skewed toward low-skilled intensive sectors, and it fell most in these sectors after trade reform.
30decades. It is less so, however, for much of trade-liberalizing Latin America, which did not receive
substantial FDI in the 1980s.
Intra-industry trade and wage inequality
Dinopoulos, Syropoulos and Xu (1999) are the ﬁrst to investigate the potential role of intra-
industry trade for wage inequality. They build a one sector model which features monopolistic
competition and plant-level increasing returns to scale on the production side, and love for variety
on the consumption side. As in Krugman (1979), they assume that the price elasticity of demand
faced by each producer increases with the number of competitors. Further, they assume that the
skill-intensity of production increases with ﬁrm size. In this model, trade liberalization raises the
number of competitors, which implies that prices fall. As a consequence, some ﬁrms are forced to
exit, thereby raising the average size of surviving ﬁrms. The eﬀect of trade on the skill premium
follows immediately from the assumption that ﬁrm size is skill-biased. This latter assumption ﬁnds
support in several plant-level empirical studies, e.g., in Idson and Oi (1999), who report that large
ﬁrms tend to employ a higher proportion of skilled workers.
Related work by Epifani and Gancia (2002) illustrates a new channel through which intra-
industry trade may increase wage inequality. The authors formulate a two-sector general equilib-
rium model which features monopolistic competition in both sectors to show that an elasticity of
substitution in consumption greater than one and higher scale economies in the skill-intensive sec-
tor imply that any increase in the volume of trade, even between identical countries, is skill-biased.
The intuition is simple. Trade expands the market size of the economy, which is beneﬁcial because
of increasing returns. In relative terms, however, output increases by more in the skill-intensive
sector, since it is characterized by stronger economi e so fs c a l e ,a n dt h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo ft h es k i l l -
intensive good therefore falls. With an elasticity of substitution in consumption greater than one,
the demand for skill-intensive goods increases more than proportionally, raising their share of total
expenditure and therefore also the relative wage of skilled workers.
This result implies that, if the skill-biased scale eﬀect is strong enough to overcome the standard
31factor proportions eﬀect, international trade will spur inequality even in the skill-poor developing
economies, making the model consistent with the evidence of rising skill-premia in developing
countries that have experienced trade liberalizations.
The authors also show that physical capital accumulation leads to higher skill premia, and that
the intersectoral mobility of capital is likely to magnify the eﬀects of trade integration on wage
inequality. These ﬁndings are consistent with both the evidence on capital relocation towards skill-
intensive sectors (Caselli, 1999) and the large literature on capital-skill complementarity (Krusell
et al, 2000).
Manasse and Turrini (2001) are the ﬁrst to study the eﬀects of intra-industry trade on labor
market outcomes in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms and workers. They build a one sector
monopolistic competition trade model al ` a Krugman (1980). Production of each variety involves a
constant marginal requirement in terms of a raw input and one unit of skilled labor as a ﬁxed cost.
Workers are heterogeneous in terms of skills. High-skilled workers produce high quality varieties
and earn higher wages, since quality is valued by consumers. Trade liberalization has striking
implications for income distribution. Because of foreign competition, all ﬁrms loose market shares
in their domestic market. At the same time, the access to foreign markets represents a concrete
opportunity to expand total sales and proﬁts only for some ﬁrms. The reason is that access to
foreign markets entails a ﬁxed cost. Hence, only those ﬁrms whose proﬁts are higher than the ﬁxed
cost of exporting can eﬀectively break into foreign markets. As a consequence, high-skilled workers
employed in ﬁrms producing high quality goods see their earnings rise after trade integration.
Conversely, less-skilled workers employed in ﬁrms producing only for the domestic market see
their earnings fall after trade integration. Thus, the model provides a trade-induced mechanism
of reallocation of resources and increasing wage dispersion which operates at the ﬁrm rather than
the sectoral level. Further, it is in line with the plant-level empirical evidence (reported below)
showing that changes in the skill premia are signiﬁcantly associated with the export status of ﬁrms.
Trade-induced skill-biased technical change
32The main alternative explanation for the worldwide increase in wage inequality is exogenous
skill-biased technical change. It has been argued that technology can be at the root of the in-
crease in inequality because recent innovations in the production process, such as the widespread
introduction of computers, have boosted the relative productivity of skilled workers.18 A recent
literature on directed technical change, initiated by Acemoglu (1998, 1999), asks whether the bias
of technological change is endogenous. In these models, innovation originates in the skill abundant
North and is then exported to the South. An important implication is that innovation responds
to economic incentives in the North. In particular, it is shown that skill-complement innovations
are more proﬁtable in a country relatively endowed with skilled workers. This implies that the
skill bias of technological change depends positively on the relative endowment of skilled workers
in the North. This result may help explain the puzzling concomitant increase both in the skill
premium and in the relative supply of skilled workers experienced by most advanced countries in
the last decades. The intuition is that the increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, which
would ceteris paribus depress the skill premium, strengthens the incentive to skill-complement in-
novations. Under certain conditions (in particular, a high elasticity of substitution between high
and low skilled-workers) the latter eﬀect prevails and determines a rise in the skill premium in the
North. As far as the South is concerned, since it passively adopts the technology developed for
the needs of the North, it is bound to import more and more skill-complement machines, with a
consequent generalized increase in the relative demand for skilled labor and in the skill premium.
The literature on directed technical change can also shed light on the relation between interna-
tional trade and the skill bias of technical change. It is shown, in particular, that North-South trade
liberalization, by increasing the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the North, increases the
proﬁtability of skill-complement innovations relative to unskill-complement innovations, thereby
magnifying the skill bias of technical change.
It is worth mentioning two other recent works investigating the link between international
18See, among others, Autor et al. [1998].
33trade and technical choice. Neary (2001) formulates a general oligopolistic equilibrium model
where a reduction in trade barriers encourages more strategic investment by incumbent ﬁrms in
order to deter entry. In particular, it is shown that, as the number of competitors in an industry
increases after trade liberalization, each ﬁrm has a greater incentive to increase its investment
in order to improve its position in the strategic oligopolistic game. Strategic over-investment by
incumbent ﬁr m st h u sr a i s e st h er a t i oo fﬁxed to variable costs. Assuming that ﬁxed investment
costs are skill-intensive relative to variable costs, the model predicts that a move towards free trade
induces a higher skill premium, a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in all sectors (i.e., skill
upgrading) and little changes in trade volumes. Hence, the model predicts that trade liberalization
can aﬀect technical change and skill premia even in the absence of signiﬁcant increases in actual
trade volumes.19
In the same vein, Ekholm and Midelfart-Knarvik (2001) develop a model where trade liberal-
ization aﬀects the technical choice of ﬁrms and can thus lead to skill-biased technical change. They
assume the existence of two technologies: one is characterized by a high (skill-intensive) ﬁxed cost
and a low (unskill-intensive) marginal cost, while the other features a low ﬁxed cost and a high
marginal cost. It is then shown that the market size expansion induced by trade liberalization
increases the relative proﬁtability of ﬁrms characterized by a high ﬁxed cost and a low marginal
cost, thus inducing the adoption of the more skill-biased technology.
5.1 Plant-level evidence on the determinants of skill upgrading
5.1.1 The role of imported technology
A recent work by Pavcnik (2000) is one of ﬁrst attempts to analyze the determinants of skill
upgrading in developing countries. She uses data on 4547 Chilean manufacturing plants spanning
19There is another important channel through which trade may increase wage inequality in the presence of
oligopolistic markets. For instance, Borjas and Ramey (1995) formulate a model where the traded sector is an
oligopoly and is low-skilled intensive relative to the rest of the economy. Firms and workers share oligopolistic rents
in the traded sector. In this setting, an exogenous increase in imports reduces rents in the oligopolistic sector,
thereby reducing the relative wage of the unskilled. Hence, the trade-induced fall of rates of returns in highly
concentrated and unionized industries, such as the automobile industry, may contribute to a worldwide increase in
wage inequality.
34the years 1979-1986. Chile represents an interesting setting to study the relation between trade
liberalization and skill upgrading in developing countries since, between 1974 and 1979, most
non-tariﬀ barriers were eliminated and tariﬀ rates were reduced from more than 100% to 10%.
Following this drastic trade liberalization, from 1979 to 1986, the share of skilled workers in total
manufacturing employment increased by almost 17%, and the skill premium grew by more than
10%.
One possible explanation for these trends is the following. Falling trade and investment barriers
bring about a decrease in the relative price of imported technology in developing countries such
as Chile, thereby stimulating technology adoption.20 If the adoption of new technology is a skill-
intensive activity, then skill upgrading and rising skill premia may be closely linked to the trade-
induced process of technology advancement.
The data used by Pavcnik provide several plant-level variables to measure technology, such as
imported materials, expenditures on patent use and rights, and expenditures on foreign technical
assistance. All of these technology measures, together with new capital investment, show a dra-
matic increase in the period following trade liberalization. In order to test whether skill upgrading
in Chile was inﬂuenced by the process of technology adoption, Pavcnik partitions plants according
to whether or not they used imported materials (or received foreign technical assistance, or used
patented technology) in the years following the trade reform. She then studies the distribution of
the wage bill share of skilled workers (which proxies for plants’ skill-intensity) for the two groups
of plants. The results are striking: the distribution of the wage bill share of plants investing in new
technology is markedly right-skewed with respect to that of non-investing ﬁrms, which means that
the probability of observing a skill-intensive plant is much higher among plants investing in new
technology. This result suggests that technology adoption is a skill-biased activity, so that plants
endowed with a higher share of skilled workers invest more in new technology.
Pavcnik also performs a regression analysis which conﬁrms that technology measures are pos-
20The evidence reported by Eaton and Kortum (1996) conﬁrms that the international diﬀusion of technology is
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the degree of protectionism.
35itively correlated with the plants’ share of skilled workers. However, the correlation disappears
when plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the estimating equation. Hence, the evidence re-
ported by Pavcnik does not allow to conclude that plants investing in new technology become
more skill-intensive over time. However, the strong evidence reported in the paper concerning the
skill-biased nature of investment in new technology still helps explain within-industry skill upgrad-
ing, as ﬁrms investing in new technology, thanks to their investment, expand their employment
share relative to non-investing ﬁrms. In other words, it is the reallocation of resources towards
more skill-intensive plants, rather than plants’ skill upgrading, which might explain why industries
become more skill-intensive over time.
5.1.2 The role of exporters
While Pavcnik (2000) focuses on the role of imported technology, a related paper by Bernard
and Jensen (1997) centers instead on the role of exporting plants for skill upgrading and wage
inequality.21 Contrary to previous studies on the determinants of skill upgrading in manufacturing,
that analyze within-industry and between-industry shifts in employment using fairly aggregated
data, Bernard and Jensen look at the contribution of individual (exporting and non-exporting)
plants to the aggregate increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. In particular, they ask
whether skill upgrading and the rise in the skill premia stem from within-plants increases in the
relative demand for skilled labor or from a reallocation of resources toward the more skill-intensive
plants. The question is of particular interest since it can shed light on the relative contribution of
trade and technology to the increased demand for skilled labor. More precisely, within-plants skill
upgrading can be mostly attributed to skill-biased technical change, i.e., to changes in production
practices (such as the widespread introduction of computers and related technologies) that have
increased the relative demand for more educated workers. On the other hand, between-plants
employment shifts can be mostly attributed to cross-plants demand shifts, and in particular to
21The data used by Bernard and Jensen come from U.S. manufacturing plants and cover the period 1973-1987.
Sample plants account for almost two thirds of total manufacturing employment in the U.S..
36trade-induced demand shifts.
The decomposition performed by Bernard and Jensen reveals that between-plants shifts explain
46% of the total increase in the relative demand for skilled labor and 58% of the total increase in
the skill premium. These results stand in sharp contrast to previous studies carried at the industry
level, where the within-industry component explain virtually all of the increase in the relative
demand for skilled labor (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994), and hence
suggest that decompositions based on industry-level data hide substantial within-industry plant
heterogeneity and potentially overestimate the importance of skill-biased technical change.
In order to determine the role of the export status of ﬁrms for the dynamics of relative wages
and employment, Bernard and Jensen look at the contribution of exporting plants to the within
and between increases. They ﬁnd that non-exporters have a within eﬀect on relative employment
21% larger than exporters, whereas the between eﬀect on employment is entirely explained by the
exporters. As for wages, the role of exporters is even stronger. The within eﬀect on wages is 26%
larger for exporters than non-exporters, whereas the between eﬀect on wages is entirely explained
by the exporters. These results suggest that the rise in wage inequality is due to employment
gains at exporting plants, even though skill upgrading is taking place at both exporters and non-
exporters.
Finally, in order to test more directly the role of technology and product demand shifts for labor
market dynamics, Bernard and Jensen regress the within and between components of relative wage
and employment increases on changes in export sales, domestic sales and technology variables, such
as the change in the R&D to sales ratio or in computer investment. The main results are that
between-plants changes (both in wages and employment) are strongly positively related to increases
in both foreign and domestic demand, with the coeﬃcient of the former three times larger than
the latter. The impact of technology measures on the between components is instead weaker.
These results suggest that the between-plants movements of workers and wages, which are crucial
for the increase in the skill premium, are largely determined by demand shifts across plants and
37in particular by export demand shifts. As for the impact of demand increases and technology
variables on the within components of wage and employment increases, it is shown, instead, that
the impact of technology measures is relatively stronger than that of demand increases, conﬁrming
that within-plants skill upgrading is mainly driven by skill-biased technical change.
The main conclusion from the work of Bernard and Jensen is that looking at plant-level evidence
instead of aggregate industry-level data reveals that trade-induced demand shifts are responsible
for substantial relocation of resources across plants, and in particular in favor of exporting plants,
and that this might explain much of the recent increase in wage inequality.
6 Trade and Labor Demand Elasticities
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nw eh a v es u m m a r i z e dt h em a i nﬁndings of the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on the determinants of the rise in wage inequality in trade liberalizing developing countries.
However, the rise in wage inequality is not the only adverse eﬀect of globalization on the welfare
of workers. A new strand of literature, initiated by Rodrik (1997), argues that there are more
subtle ways through which globalization may reduce the welfare of workers and jeopardize social
stability. The main argument, set out informally by Rodrik, is that reduced barriers to trade and
investment exacerbate the asymmetry between groups that can cross international borders and
those that cannot. The former groups, which include skilled workers, professionals and owners of
capital, are freer to take their resources where their reward is highest. The latter groups, which
mainly include unskilled workers, are instead tied to their country of origin because they are less
capable of taking advantage of the richer menu of opportunities oﬀered by the global market. The
main consequence is that the demand for large segments of the working population becomes more
elastic, since these workers can be more easily substituted by other workers across national borders.
Rodrik argues that a trade-induced increase in labor demand elasticities has the following
adverse consequences for the welfare of workers: 1) a shift of the incidence of non-wage labor costs
towards labor and away from employers; 2) more uncertainty due to more volatile responses of
38wages and employment to any exogenous shock to labor demand; 3) a reduced bargaining power
of workers.
Given the relevance of the labor demand elasticity for the welfare of workers, it is useful to see
more formally how it can be inﬂuenced by trade liberalization. As shown by Hamermesh (1993)
and Slaughter (2001), an industry’s labor demand elasticity, η, can be decomposed as follows:
η =[ 1− s]² + sσ (21)
where s is the labor share of total industry revenue, ² is the constant-output elasticity of substi-
tution between labor and all other factors of production, and σ is the industry product-demand
elasticity.22 Equation (21) shows that η consists of two parts. The ﬁrst, [1 − s]²,c a p t u r e st h e
substitution eﬀect. It tells, for a given level of output, how much the industry substitutes away
from labor towards other factors when wages rise. The second part, sσ, captures the output eﬀect:
higher wages imply higher costs and thus a lower demand for an industry’s output, which translates
into a lower demand for labor. Thus, both the substitution and the output eﬀects contribute to
reduce labor demand when wages rise. Finally, note that the higher the share s of labor in total
cost, the higher the relative importance of the product demand elasticity for the labor demand
elasticity.
Note that trade liberalization can inﬂuence the elasticities ² and σ, and thus also the derived
labor demand elasticity η. First consider σ. A ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n2 ,t r a d em o d e l sb a s e do ni m p e r f e c t
competition generally imply that trade liberalization increases the product-market demand elas-
ticity. Consider now the constant-output elasticity of substitution ² between labor and all other
factors. Suppose that an industry is vertically integrated with a number of production stages.
With international trade, stages can move abroad either within ﬁrms by establishing multinational
corporations with foreign aﬃliates (as in Helpman, 1984), or by buying the output of those stages
from other ﬁrms (as in Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). Trade thus gives access to foreign production
22In equation (21) all the elasticities are deﬁned to be positive.
39factors either directly through foreign aﬃliates or indirectly through intermediate inputs. As a con-
sequence, trade and investment liberalization expand the set of factors an industry can substitute
towards in response to higher domestic wages, thus increasing ².
To summarize, trade and investment liberalization can potentially increase the labor demand
elasticity either by increasing the product-market demand elasticity or by increasing the elasticity
of substitution between labor and all other production factors. Next, we turn to the empirical
evidence to see whether trade liberalization actually increased labor demand elasticities.
6.1 Evidence on patterns in labor demand elasticities
6.1.1 Industry-level evidence
The ﬁrst rigorous attempt to estimate the impact of international trade on labor demand elasticities
is provided by Slaughter (2001). He uses the NBER Productivity Data Base to estimate time series
of labor demand elasticities from 1961 to 1991 for production and non-production workers for U.S.
manufacturing overall and for eight manufacturing industries. The estimated elasticities are then
regressed on several trade measures to see whether patterns in trade can explain the estimated
patterns in the labor demand elasticities.
The main trade measures used by Slaughter include exports, imports or net exports as a share
of shipments, measures of trends in transport costs (e.g., the ratio of c.i.f. import value to customs
import value), measures of outsourcing (e.g., the share of imported intermediates), multinational
measures (e.g., foreign aﬃliate share of U.S. multinationals’ total employment), et cetera.
The main ﬁndings of Slaughter can be summarized as follows. In the period of analysis, the
demand elasticity for production labor has increased in manufacturing overall and in most manu-
facturing industries (in particular, it has almost doubled since the mid-1970s). On the other hand,
t h e r ei sn os i g no fa ni n c r e a s eo v e rt i m ei nt h ed e m a nd elasticity for non-production labor (indeed,
this elasticity has fallen in the last decades).
As far as the eﬀect of trade on production labor is concerned, Slaughter ﬁnds that most of his
40trade measures have a positive impact on the elasticity of demand for production labor and are
generally statistically signiﬁcant. The results turn insigniﬁcant, however, when time dummies or
a time trend are included in the regressions.23 One possible explanation for the lack of robustness
of trade measures to the inclusion of time controls may be the high collinearity between time and
these trade measures. However, the high statistical signiﬁcance and robustness of the coeﬃcient
of the time trend suggests that time is picking up some force constantly making production labor
more elastic over time. In this respect, it is likely that it is not actual trade that matters, but
rather potential trade. That is, what might matter for labor demand is just the ability to transact
internationally regardless of whether such transactions actually occur. Thus, trade might be playing
an important role independent of changes in observables such as trade and foreign direct investment
ﬂows.
Finally, as far as the eﬀect of trade on non-production labor is concerned, Slaughter ﬁnds that
many of his trade measures have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the elasticity of demand
for non-production labor, and that, contrary to the case of production labor, these measures are
generally robust to the inclusion of time controls.
6.1.2 Plant-level evidence
Krishna, Mitra and Chinoy (2001) use Turkish plant-level data spanning the course of a dramatic
trade liberalization to test whether greater openness led to an increase in labor demand elasticities.
Until the early 1980s, the manufacturing sector in Turkey received an extraordinarily high level
of protection: the average tariﬀ in 1981 was estimated to be 49%. Further, for over half of
the products, tariﬀ equivalent of non-tariﬀ barriers were estimated to be over 100%. An import
liberalization program was announced in December 1983 and implemented soon after, leading to
a dramatic fall of both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers.
Krishna et al. use annual data from the Turkish manufacturing census for 10 three-digit ISIC
23Similarly, using data from a broad sample of OECD countries, Bruno, Falzoni and Helg (2001) ﬁnd little impact
of various trade measures on labor demand elasticities in most of these countries.
41industries covering all plants in the greater Istanbul area and spanning the years 1983-1986. Eight
of the ten industries saw a dramatic fall in protection after trade reform. The labor demand
elasticity is estimated for each of the ten industries separately, including ﬁrm-speciﬁcd u m m i e s
to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity. The main result is that, although most elasticities are precisely
estimated and fall in a reasonable range, estimates of the changes in labor demand elasticities are
small in magnitude and largely insigniﬁcant.24
The failure to reject the nul of no changes in labor demand elasticities is somewhat surprising,
since previous studies using the same data (e.g., Levinsohn, 1993) strongly suggest that trade
liberalization in Turkey led to substantial increases in product-market demand elasticities. From
(21) we know that higher product demand elasticities should have translated into higher labor
demand elasticities. One possible explanation for this contradictory evidence is that labor demand
decisions by ﬁrms are subject to several frictions, so that it takes time before changes in product
demand elasticities lead to observable changes in labor demand elasticities.
7 Evidence on the Eﬀects of Trade Reform in India
7.1 Salient aspects of trade and investment reforms
Until the late eighties India’s economic system was highly regulated, so much to lead some com-
mentators to lump (erroneously, according to Basu and Pattanaik, 1997, p.123) India together with
Russia and China as examples of centrally planned economies. In June 1991, following a balance of
payment crisis, a newly elected government manifested its willingness to undertake deep structural
reforms and introduced drastic policy changes in the subsequent years. The main features of these
policy changes can be summarized as follows.
The trade policy regime changed abruptly and dramatically. Prior to the reform, it was one
of the world’s most regulated and protectionist trade regime, characterized by severe quantitative
24Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001) use plant-level panel data for Chile, Colombia and Mexico across their periods
of reform to estimate labor demand elasticities in these countries. Their results show little evidence of structural
breaks after trade reform in these countries, and of trade-induced increases in labor demand elasticities.
42restrictions and very high import tariﬀs. On the export side, there were both export controls and
export incentive schemes. Following the reform, the maximum tariﬀ was reduced from 400% to
150% in July 1991 and still further later to reach 64% in 1994. The average tariﬀ was reduced from
128% to 94% in 1992 and then to 55% in 1994. In 1992, import licences were abolished except
for a limited group of sectors mainly producing consumption goods. Export subsidies and controls
were abolished.
The industrial policy was completely overhauled.25 Most barriers to entry into industries were
removed. Industrial licensing was abolished in almost all sectors. Controls over investment and
expansion by large industrial ﬁrms were also abolished, while the list of industries reserved for the
public sector was drastically reduced.
The foreign investment policy was also completely restructured. Prior to the reforms, India’s
policy toward foreign investment was very restrictive. Equity participation was limited to 40%,
except in a few high-tech or export-oriented sectors. With the reform, this limit was raised to 51%
and foreign investment was permitted in a much larger number of sectors. Further, the Foreign
Investment Promotion Board was created to stimulate FDI in India and the country entered into
bilateral and multilateral investment guarantee schemes.
Finally, the exchange rate regime was restructured. The highly controlled regime based on a
chronically overvalued exchange rate was dismantled. In 1992, a dual exchange rate was introduced,
and in 1994 the rupee became fully convertible on the current account. The capital account has
not yet been liberalized. The restructuring of the exchange rate regime was accompanied by two
substantial devaluations of the rupee. However, due to an immediate pass-through to domestic
inﬂation, the real devaluation of the rupee was less than 7% (annually) in the years following the
reforms.
In the rest of this section, we review the main empirical studies which have used ﬁrm and
plant-level panel data to investigate the eﬀects of this dramatic trade and investment liberalization
25See, inter alia, Jha (2000).
43on the performance of Indian manufacturing ﬁrms and labor markets.
7.2 Trade liberalization and ﬁrm performance in Indian manufacturing
Two recent studies, Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Balakrishnan et al. (2000), provide an attempt
at a rigorous test of the eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁrm performance in Indian manufacturing.
Both studies use ﬁrm-level data obtained from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE).
In both papers, the empirical analysis draws on the methodology developed by Hall (1988) and
Harrison (1994), which allows to examine the eﬀects of the 1991 trade liberalization on ﬁrms’
mark-ups, productivity growth and the degree of exploitation of returns to scale. Notwithstanding
these similarities, the two papers reach completely diﬀerent conclusions.
The data used by Krishna and Mitra (1998) spans the years 1986-1993 and cover the following
manufacturing industries: Electronics, Electrical machinery, Non-electrical machinery and Trans-
port equipment. The authors ﬁnd that in all industries except Electrical machinery there were
reductions in returns to scale after 1991. This reduction in returns to scale may reﬂect an in-
creased exploitation of returns to scale by ﬁrms operating at too small a scale prior to the reform.
Krishna and Mitra also ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant reductions in mark-ups in the same industries
in the years following the reform.26 Finally, they ﬁnd evidence of increases in the growth rate of
productivity (ranging from 3 to 6%) in all industries except Transport equipment. This evidence
suggests that the 1991 trade liberalization in India was associated with a strong pro-competitive
eﬀect leading to falling mark-ups, to an increased exploitation of scale economies and an increased
growth rate of total factor productivity. Notice that these eﬀects are in line with the predictions
of the simple model illustrated in Section 2.
The data used by Balakrishnan et al. (2000) span the years 1988 to 1998 and cover the
following manufacturing industries: Machinery, Transport equipment, Textiles, Textile products
and Chemicals. In contrast to Krishna and Mitra (1998), these authors ﬁnd a 1% fall in the annual
26For Electrical machinery, Krishna and Mitra ﬁnd a slight increase in the mark-up. They argue, however, that
mark-up estimates for this industry are little reliable.
44rate of productivity growth in the post-trade liberalization period. Further, they ﬁnd a slight
increase (rather than a reduction) in returns to scale after the trade reform, although the returns
to scale estimated by these authors for the pre-reform period are much lower than those estimated
by Krishna and Mitra (1998). Indeed, Balakrishnan et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence of decreasing
returns to scale, whereas Krishna and Mitra (1998) ﬁnd evidence of strong increasing returns to
scale in all sectors except Electrical machinery.
Given the substantial overlap between the time periods and industries covered by the data used
in the two studies, the striking diﬀerences in the results are likely to be caused by diﬀerences in
the methodology used to measure factor inputs and in the econometric strategy. In particular,
Balakrishnan et al. (2000) use the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator, use instrumental variables to control for
the endogeneity of factor inputs and pool together ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent sectors. In contrast,
Krishna and Mitra (1998) use the random-eﬀects estimator, do not control for the endogeneity of
inputs and perform separate regressions for each sector.
Finally, notice that, similar to Balakrishnan et al. (2000), other works ﬁnd a reduction in the
rate of productivity growth of Indian ﬁrms in the post-liberalization period. Srivastava (2000) uses
data for about 3000 Indian companies for the period 1980 to 1997. He ﬁnds a decline in the rate
of productivity growth in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Kumari (2000) uses ﬁrm level data
relative to engineering industries (electrical and non-electrical groups) for the period 1985 to 1995.
She ﬁnds that productivity growth of engineering ﬁrms has declined in the post-reform period as
compared to the pre-reform period.
To sum up, contrary to other trade liberalizing developing countries, the available micro-level
evidence does not allow yet to discern the eﬀects of the 1991 trade reform in India on ﬁrms’ mark-
ups, on the degree of exploitation of returns to scale and on productivity growth. Aside from
methodological issues (see section 3.2), one possible explanation for this lack of positive results
is that India is still a highly regulated economy, and hence the expected beneﬁcial eﬀects of the
trade-induced reallocation of resources will take longer to materialize.
457.3 Trade and technical eﬃciency of Indian manufacturing ﬁrms
Parameswarn (2000) uses ﬁrm-level data to analyze the evolution of technical eﬃciency of Indian
ﬁrms. The data (obtained from CMIE) span the years 1989 to 1998 and are relative to 640
ﬁrms belonging to four industries: Electrical machinery, Non-electrical machinery, Electronics and
Transport equipment. In order to estimate technical in/eﬃciency, the author uses the stochastic
frontier production approach developed by Battese and Coelli (1995), which involves estimating a
production function of the type:
yit = f(kit,l it,m it,t) − uit + εit (22)
where all variables are in logarithms, and yit is output of ﬁrm i at time t. The function f(·)
represents the frontier technology, whose inputs are physical capital (kit), labor (lit), materials
(mit)a n dt i m et (to allow the frontier to shift over time). εit is an error term, and uit is a non-
negative random variable that captures technical ineﬃciency. Parameswarn asks which variables
aﬀect technical eﬃciency in Indian manufacturing industries. His main ﬁndings are the following.
Technical eﬃciency (−uit) is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with R&D intensity in all
sectors, suggesting that R&D activities may contribute to reduce technical ineﬃciency of Indian
ﬁrms. Export intensity has a positive eﬀect on technical eﬃciency in all sectors except Electronics,
where it has instead a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on technical eﬃciency. Technology import
intensity has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on technical eﬃciency in Electrical machinery and
Transport equipment and a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect in the other two sectors. The negative
impact of technology imports on technical eﬃciency in high-tech sectors such as Electronics and
Non-electrical machinery is indeed surprising. Another surprising ﬁnding is that in all sectors
technical eﬃciency is negatively correlated with a time dummy variable which takes a value of zero
up to 1991 and a value of one thereafter. Hence, trade liberalization seems to be associated with
an increased average technical ineﬃciency in Indian manufacturing.
46One possible explanation for these results is the failure by Indian ﬁrms in the adoption and
mastering of new technology. Another possible explanation is that trade liberalization may have
changed the kind of technology imported by Indian ﬁrms. In particular, technology imports may
have shifted away from technology which contributes to proﬁts and productivity within a relatively
short time lag and toward technology which makes a more direct contribution to ﬁrms’ technological
capabilities but requires a longer gestation lag. If this is the case, this shift in the kind of technology
imports may contribute to explain why most studies ﬁnd that trade liberalization in India is
associated with a reduced productivity growth.
7.4 Trade liberalization and R&D eﬀo r ti nI n d i a nm a n u f a c t u r i n g
Kumar and Aggarwal (2000) uses ﬁrm-level data for the period 1992-1997 to study the trend and
determinants of R&D activity in Indian manufacturing after trade liberalization. The analysis is
motivated by the concern for the declining importance of R&D activity in India. In particular,
while the proportion of world GDP devoted to R&D has steadily increased in the last decades to
reach 2.5% in the 1990s, the opposite occurred in India, where the proportion of national resources
devoted to R&D fell from 0.98% in 1988 to 0.66 in 1997. Since more than 70% of R&D expenditure
in India is ﬁnanced by the government, much of this downward trend is explained by the ﬁscal
reform of the 1990s, which drastically reduced investment expenditure and subsidies to ﬁrms in
order to reduce the ﬁscal budget deﬁcit. At the micro-level, the evidence shows diﬀerent patterns
in R&D expenditure between local ﬁrms and MNE aﬃliates in India. In particular, while in the
1990s the average R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D spending to sales) of local ﬁrms is still slightly
higher than that of MNE aﬃliates (0.854% versus 0.818%, respectively), the trend for local ﬁrms is
declining (from 0.868% to 0.831%), while that for MNE aﬃliates is steadily increasing (from 0.766%
to 0.852%). These trends suggest an increasingly central role of MNE aﬃliates for technological
upgrading of Indian manufacturing.
The ﬁrm-level econometric analysis performed by Kumar and Aggarwal shows that ﬁrms’ R&D
47intensity is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with technology imports, outward orientation and
capital goods imports. However, when performing separate regressions for local ﬁrms and MNE
aﬃliates, it turns out that, in contrast to local ﬁrms, MNE aﬃliates’ R&D eﬀort is not correlated
with export intensity and capital goods import intensity. MNE aﬃliates’ R&D intensity is instead
positively correlated with their proﬁtability, as measured by the price-cost margin. According to
the authors, one possible explanation for these ﬁndings is that local ﬁrms direct their R&D activity
toward absorption of imported technology and outward expansion. In contrast, given their captive
access to the laboratories of their parents and associated companies, MNE aﬃliates’ R&D eﬀort is
primarily directed toward customization of their parents’ technology for the local market in those
activities that are more proﬁtable.
7.5 Employment eﬀects of trade reform in Indian manufacturing
According to the traditional trade theory, trade liberalization expands the (comparative advan-
tage) exporting sector at the expense of the (comparative disadvantage) import competing sector.
However, this trade-induced sectoral reallocation of resources has no eﬀect on aggregate employ-
ment, because of the assumption of factor market clearing. In practice, in the presence of frictions
in the labor market and of a sluggish intersectoral mobility of resources, a drastic trade liberaliza-
tion, such as the one experienced by India in recent years, can reduce employment in the import
competing sector and thus raise the short-run rate of unemployment. Indeed, fear of increased
unemployment in the import competing sector has often been the main reason against trade lib-
eralization in developing countries pursuing a development strategy based on import substitution.
However, as noted by Harrison and Revenga (1994), contrary to the predictions of the standard
trade theory, most empirical studies ﬁnd only a modest eﬀect of trade liberalization in developing
countries on the employment level in import competing sectors.27
Kambhampati et al. (1997) examine the eﬀects of the 1991 trade reform in India on employment
27See, for instance, Rama (1994) on Uruguay, Revenga (1994) on Mexico, Currie and Harrison (1994) on Morocco.
See also Harrison and Hanson (1999) on Mexico and Morocco.
48in ﬁve import competing sectors.28 They use ﬁrm-level data taken from CMIE. The data cover the
period 1987-1993. Similar to the results from previous studies, they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant employment
eﬀect of trade reform overall and in each of the ﬁve sectors studied. More interestingly, the authors
formulate and test a speciﬁc explanation for the lack of employment contraction in the import
competing sectors. They argue that, in the presence of imperfect competition, trade liberalization
raises ﬁrms’ perceived product demand elasticity and hence induces them to lower mark-ups and
expand output. Hence, the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization may involve an increase
in the demand for labor. This eﬀect may partially oﬀset the labor demand reduction in import
competing sectors induced by the forces of comparative advantage.29
In order to test this prediction, Kambhampati et al. (1997) estimate the following equation:
lit = β0 + β1ωt + β2θit + β3kit + β4mit + β5D + εit (23)
Here, l,ω,θ,kand m are the natural logs of L, w/P, Θ,Kand M, respectively; D is a liberalization
dummy, which takes a value of zero for the years 1991 and before and a value of 1 for the years after;
ε is a stochastic error.30 The regression results reported by the authors, obtained by using the
random-eﬀect estimator, show that, overall and in four of the ﬁve sectors studied31, both the real
wage and the mark-up are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with ﬁrms’ labor demand. This
evidence suggests that when the import competing sectors of a liberalizing country are imperfectly
competitive, then the output contraction in these sectors (and the consequent short-run surge in
unemployment) may be much less dramatic than expected in the light of the traditional trade
theory.
28The ﬁve import competing sectors are: Electronics, Electrical machinery, Non-electrical machinery, Transport
equipment and a sector that only includes ﬁrms that produce Diversiﬁed products.
29See also Harrison and Hanson (1999) on this point.
30The ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization imply that the demand for both K and M is a function of
L. Hence, there is a simultaneity problem in the estimation of the labor demand equation. In order to correct for
this endogeneity of capital and materials, the authors use as instrumental variables the predicted values of K and
L obtained by regressing them on a set of exogenous variables.
31Results for the sector producing Diversiﬁed products turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
497.6 Trade liberalization in India: greater uncertainty versus a richer
menu of opportunities ?
In Section 6, we have shown that a trade-induced increase in product demand elasticities should
also bring about an increase in the derived labor demand elasticities. As shown by Rodrik (1997),
this implies that workers exposed to international competition should face a higher volatility of
wages and employment in response to exogenous shocks to labor demand. Daveri, Manasse and
Serra (2002) argue that trade-induced increases in the volatility of factor prices and employment
are only part of the story, since ﬁrms and workers exposed to international competition may also
h a v eag r e a t e ri n c e n t i v et oi n v e s ti np r o d u c t i v i ty enhancing activities, such as training and eﬀort,
in order to hedge the risk of lower incomes. The aim of the authors is hence to test the empirical
relevance, in the case of India, of what they call “the twin eﬀects of globalization”, i.e., higher
uncertainty versus a richer menu of opportunities for ﬁrms and workers involved in international
competition.
The data used by the authors come from a survey of 895 Indian ﬁrms belonging to ﬁve manu-
facturing sectors: Garments, Textiles, Pharmaceuticals, Electronic consumer goods and Electrical
white goods. The data, which cover the period 1997-1999, have recently been collected by the
World Bank. In order to test their hypotheses, the authors partition ﬁrms into the following three
groups. Firms exporting at least 30% of their output are deﬁned as Exporters (they represent 37%
of the total), non-exporting ﬁrms declaring to face foreign competition in their domestic market
are deﬁned as Import-Competing ﬁrms (27% of the total), and the rest of the ﬁr m sb e l o n gt ot h e
group of Protected ﬁrms (36% of the total). Note that ﬁrms belonging to the former two groups
are directly exposed to international competition and hence, by comparing their evolution to that
of protected ﬁrms, we can infer something about the pros and cons of globalization. Consider un-
certainty ﬁrst. Let wit = µi +υit represent a variable pertaining to ﬁrm i at time t (i.e., the wage
rate, proﬁts, sales, employment or prices), where µi and υit are is its permanent and transitory
components. The variance of wit c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na st h es u mo fσ2
µ + σ2
υ, where the former
50represents cross-sectional variation and the latter temporal variation of wit. Hence, σ2
υ captures
uncertainty due to, e.g., wage volatility. Performing this decomposition shows that exporters and
import-competing ﬁrms are characterized by a higher transitory variance of wages, employment,
sales, prices and (to a lesser extent) proﬁts. The authors also perform a regression analysis in
which the transitory component of ﬁrm-level variables is regressed on dummies for exporters and
import-competing ﬁrms, sectoral and regional dummies, and size. Estimation results show that in
most speciﬁcations the dummies for exporters and import-competing ﬁrms are positive, and they
are often also highly signiﬁcant. These results suggest that, consistent with the authors’ prior,
exposure to international trade is associated with greater uncertainty due to higher volatility of
wages, proﬁts and employment.
Consider now the potential pros of trade exposure. The authors focus, in particular, on training
and promotions. Their prior is that ﬁrms exposed to foreign competition have a greater incentive
to train their workforce in order to increase its productivity, thereby reducing the uncertainty
due to more volatile proﬁts. At the same time, workers have an incentive to produce a greater
eﬀort to obtain promotions, thereby reducing the uncertainty due to higher wage and employment
volatility. In this respect, data reveal that the share of workers engaged in training programs is
31% for exporters, 36% for import-competing ﬁrms and only 19% for protected ﬁrms. Further, the
percentage of workers being promoted in the ﬁrm’s ladder in 1999 equals 4% for exporting ﬁrms,
1.4% for import competing ﬁrms and 1.7% for protected ﬁrms.
The regression analysis performed by the authors shows that the percentage of trained workers
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the dummy for import-competing ﬁrms, even after
controlling for size and for sectoral and regional dummies. Further, they regress the probability of
a promotion on the dummies for exporters and import-competing ﬁrms. Estimation results reveal
that the former dummy is positive and signiﬁcant, even after controlling for sectoral dummies, for
size and for a proxy of productivity growth.32
32The authors also check the robustness of their results with respect to the methodology of estimation. In partic-
ular, they estimate the impact of trade exposure on uncertainty, training and promotions using a non-parametric
51To sum up, evidence on Indian manufacturing ﬁrms suggests that, although trade liberalization
may have increased uncertainty for ﬁrms and workers, it may also have provided them with a
powerful incentive to increase productivity, thereby inducing more investment in training of the
workforce on the part of ﬁrms, and more eﬀort (aimed at promotions) on the part of workers.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the micro-level evidence on the eﬀects of trade liberalization in
developing countries. We have focused, in particular, on the empirical relevance of the eﬀects
predicted by the trade theory in the presence of increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition
and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
1) There is indirect evidence of trade-induced productivity gains in the developing countries
opting for freer trade. In particular, ﬁrms’ productivity growth generally rises after trade reforms.
More interestingly, the evidence shows that the productivity of ﬁrms exposed to international
competition (i.e., exporters and import-competing ﬁrms) grows much more than that of ﬁrms
belonging to the non-traded sectors.
2) The evidence suggests that output share reallocations among ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity
levels are the main source of trade-induced productivity gains. This result is in line with trade
models, such as Melitz (2002), in which ﬁrm heterogeneity and sunk entry costs into foreign markets
play a crucial role in the mechanics of eﬃciency gains from trade liberalization.
3) Firms in import-competing sectors enjoy the highest eﬃciency gains from trade. One ex-
planation for this result is that the disciplining eﬀect of trade liberalization is stronger in import
competing sectors. Another is that the beneﬁts stemming from cheaper imports of (embodied or
disembodied) technology are more relevant for ﬁrms belonging to the comparative disadvantage
technology-intensive sectors.
approach which produces remarkably consistent results.
524) There is no evidence of relevant scale eﬃciency gains. This result, which runs counter to
conventional wisdom about the sources of gains from trade in the presence of scale economies,
can be explained as follows. First, the evidence suggests that large ﬁrms, which account for a
disproportionate share of industry output, are close to minimum eﬃcient scale and hence their
scale eﬃciency is unaﬀected by trade liberalization. Second, most small ﬁrms operating at an
ineﬃcient scale are de facto insulated from foreign competition, since they only compete for local
market niches. Third, the recent episodes of trade reform in the developing world often represent
examples of unilateral trade liberalization, which does not imply scale eﬃciency gains. Indeed, the
trade theory suggests that under certain conditions (e.g., competition ` al aCournot with segmented
markets) unilateral trade liberalization reduces scale eﬃciency in the trade liberalizing country.
5) There is robust evidence of a pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization. The pro-
competitive eﬀect shows up as reduced price-marginal cost mark-ups for ﬁrms exposed to foreign
competition, especially if they belong to highly concentrated industries.
6) There is no evidence, in the short-run, either of learning-by-exporting eﬀects or of beneﬁcial
spillover eﬀects from foreign owned ﬁrms to local ﬁrms. In particular, exporting ﬁrms are more
eﬃcient than non-exporting ﬁrms, but their productivity trajectories do not seem to change after
they break into foreign markets. Similarly, foreign owned ﬁrms are in general more eﬃcient than
local ﬁrms, but their presence does not seem to positively inﬂuence the productivity of local ﬁrms
b e l o n g i n gt ot h es a m es e c t o r s .
7) The plant-level evidence suggests to reconsider the role played international trade in the
dramatic increase in wage inequality observed in most trade liberalizing developing countries. In
particular, there is weak evidence that skill upgrading is correlated with measures of imported
technology. Hence, trade liberalization, by reducing the price of imported technology, may spur
the demand for imported technology, which in turn may increase the relative demand for skilled
labor, as technology adoption is a skill-intensive activity. Further, there is evidence that exporting
plants expand at the expense of non-exporting plants after trade liberalization. Since the former
53are skill-intensive relative to the latter, this implies that trade-induced output share reallocations
among ﬁrms with diﬀerent skill-intensity can be a crucial determinant of industry skill upgrading
and rising wage inequality.
8) There is evidence of a substantial increase in the demand elasticity for unskilled labor and
of a stable or decreasing demand elasticity for skilled labor, although it is not clear whether the
upward trend in the former is trade-induced. From a theoretical standpoint, the labor demand
elasticity is relevant because its rise generally brings about a rise also in wage volatility. As for
the latter, however, there is direct evidence that ﬁrms exposed to international competition face a
higher wage volatility than ﬁrms belonging to the non-traded sectors.
9 )T h e r ei sn oe v i d e n c eo fs u b s t a n t i a le m p l o y m ent contraction in import competing sectors
after trade reforms. This implies that a dramatic short-run surge in unemployment is not a likely
consequence of trade liberalization. One possible explanation for this result is that, at least in
the short-run, the tendency toward contraction of the comparative disadvantage sectors is oﬀset
by other forces. For instance, in the presence of imperfect competition, trade liberalization, by
reducing mark-ups, may force ﬁrms to expand output and employment to cover ﬁxed costs.
In short, trade liberalization brings about eﬃciency gains, mainly through a reallocation of
resources toward more eﬃcient, outward oriented and skill-intensive ﬁrms. In turn, this involves
skill upgrading, higher wage inequality and higher wage volatility. All this suggests that a greater
availability of skilled workers may magnify the eﬃciency gains from trade reform, on the one hand,
and dampen its negative distributional eﬀects on the other. These results naturally lead to the
policy implication that a successful trade liberalization should be accompanied by policies aimed
at improving the average level of education of the workforce. This would in fact facilitate the
expansion of more eﬃcient skill-intensive ﬁrms and the absorption of imported technology, while
a tt h es a m et i m er e d u c i n gt h ep r essure on the skill premium.
As far as India is concerned, a further policy suggested by the somewhat disappointing evi-
dence on the eﬀects of trade reform on Indian ﬁrms’ productivity growth is to further deregulate
54the economy in order to stimulate the ﬁrm to ﬁrm mobility of resources so as to allow a better
exploitation of trade-induced eﬃciency gains.
It is worth noting, in closing, that the above results are not robust enough, however. They
are often plagued by methodological hurdles (in particular, by the diﬃculty to identify the trade
eﬀects), or by the poor quality of the data, and in particular by the fact that, while most trade
eﬀects only materialize in the long-run, most empirical analyses are bounded, instead, to look at
data which only cover very short time spans. Empirical studies on the eﬀects of India’s trade liber-
alization are not exempt from these problems. This may help explain, for instance, the contrasting
results concerning the productivity gains from India’s trade reform. Hence more eﬀort is necessary
to better our understanding of the eﬀects of trade reforms in developing countries in general, and
in India in particular.
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